This paper examines financial stability issues that arise from the increased presence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in global financial markets by assessing whether and how stock markets react to the announcements of investments and divestments to firms by SWFs using an event study approach. Based on 166 publicly traceable events collected on investments and divestments by major SWFs during the period from 1990 to 2009, the paper evaluates the short-term financial impact of SWFs on selected public equity markets in which they invest. The impact is analyzed on different sectors (financial and nonfinancial), actions (buy and sell), market types (developed and emerging markets), and level of corporate governance (high and low score). Results, based on these 166 events, show that there was no significant destabilizing effect of SWFs on equity markets, which is consistent with anecdotal evidence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in the summer of 2007, financial stability has been at the forefront of policy discussions. At the same time, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become dominant players, as they have injected significant capital in major financial institutions. Recently in some countries, SWFs were instructed by their governments to invest into domestic financial institutions and the overall stock market in order to support battered stock prices. Research on the financial stability implications of these funds has been slowly emerging, hampered by lack of data on their asset allocations.
There have been many arguments put forth regarding the potential positive and negative effects of SWFs on global financial markets. For example, some argue that SWFs can play a stabilizing role in global financial markets. First, many commentators point out that as longterm investors with no imminent call on their assets, and with mainly unleveraged positions, SWFs are able to sit out longer during market downturns or even trade against market trends. In addition, SWFs in some countries, particularly in the Middle East, have recently supported domestic equity markets and financial institutions. Second, large SWFs may have an interest in pursuing portfolio reallocations gradually so as to limit adverse price effects of their transactions. Third, SWFs could, as long-term investors and by adding diversity to the global investor base, contribute to greater market efficiency, lower volatility, and increased depth of markets. Fourth, SWF investments may enhance the depth and breadth of markets.
Although SWFs appear to have been a stabilizing force thus far, given their size, there are circumstances in which they could cause volatility in markets. Having large and often intransparent positions in financial markets, SWFs-like other large institutional investorshave the potential to cause a market disturbance. For instance, actual or rumored transactions may affect relative valuations in particular sectors and result in herding behavior, adding to volatility. Deeper markets, such as currency markets, can also be affected, at least temporarily, by rumors or announcements about changes in currency allocations by central banks or SWFs. To the extent that SWFs invest through hedge funds that rely on leverage or are subject to margin requirements, such investments may inadvertently magnify market changes. For markets to absorb flows from any major investor class without large price fluctuations, it helps if they can anticipate the broad allocation and risk-preference trends of such investor classes. Opacity about such trends can lead to inaccurate pricing and volatility. As regards these financial stability implications of SWFs, both theoretical and empirical research has begun to be implemented. The paper proceeds as follows: Section II briefly reviews the literature and some conceptual issues. Section III outlines an event study approach and describes data. Section IV presents empirical results. Section V concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
SWFs are defined as special-purpose investment funds or arrangements owned by the general government. They are often established out of balance of payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, or receipts resulting from commodity exports. Their total size has been estimated at $2 trillion to $3 trillion, but many of them have probably seen large unrealized losses from the ongoing financial crisis combined with a sharp reduction in oil prices 3 . These unrealized losses have been higher for SWFs that have a higher share of equities in their investment portfolio or large illiquid 2 With the continuing increase in banks' losses and writedowns during the subprime crisis, the rescue of Bear Stearns, collapse of Lehman Brothers and U.S. government intervention into major financial institutions, the longer term share price development of banks that obtained initial capital injections from various SWFs, has been obviously very negative. But the short-term reaction of SWFs financial support has been perceived as very supportive by the financial market in most cases. positions in private equity or hedge funds. Given that SWFs typically have a fairly long investment horizon, they are likely to sit out these unrealized losses.
Given the lack of publicly available data on SWF asset allocations, a strand of research has been on the theory side. Lam and Rossi (forthcoming) develop a theoretical model that aims to examine the impact of SWFs on global financial stability during periods of stress. Their findings indicate that SWFs have a risk-sharing role in financial markets. As part of the IMFcoordinated process of the Santiago Principles that provide generally accepted principles and practices for SWFs, Hammer, Kunzel, and Petrova (2008) examine the asset allocation and risk management frameworks of SWFs based on a detailed survey. The results show that SWFs have specific investment objectives in place, adopt an asset approach (mean-variance style) in determining their asset allocation strategy, utilize common risk measures (e.g., credit ratings, value-at-risk models, tracking errors, duration, and currency weights) for their risk management, and have explicit limits in their investment classes and instruments.
Simulations of SWFs' asset allocations have been undertaken by Kozack, Laxton, and Srinivasan (forthcoming) . Specifically, they create two stylized diversified portfolios, one mimicking Norway's SWF and the other representing some well-established SWFs, and they conduct a scenario analysis of the impact from a further diversification of sovereign assets. While the calibrations are highly sensitive to the underlying model assumptions, the findings indicate that advanced economies will see lower capital inflows, while emerging market countries will be the primary beneficiaries. Their quantitative results are consistent with the back-of-the envelope calculations of Beck and Fidora (2008) , which imply a net capital outflow from the United States and the euro area and net inflows to emerging market countries over the medium-term. In the same vein, Jen and Miles (2007) and Hoguet (2008) points out that there is scope for the global equity risk premium to fall and for real bond yields to rise if SWFs allocate their assets to equities. In addition, as SWFs increasingly diversify into global portfolios, their activities may place some downward pressure on the dollar as they exit dollar-denominated assets.
There has been some empirical research, using equity market indicators and an event study approach to examine the role of SWFs as major institutional investors. For instance, in an event study, Chhaochharia and Laeven (2008) find that the announcement effect of SWF investments is positive. They report that share prices of firms respond favorably when SWFs announce investments, in part because these investments happen when their targets are in financial distress. But the long-run performance of equity investments by SWFs tends to be poor (see Fotak, Bortolotti, and Megginson, 2008 , for similar results). Another event study analysis by Bortolotti, Fotak, Megginson, and Miracky (2009) based on the Monitor Group database of SWF transactions also finds a positive short-run announcement effect of SWF investments and negative long run abnormal returns. Dewenter, Han, and Delesta (2009) and Knill, Lee and Mauck (2009) obtain similar results. Kotter and Lel (2008) show that the cumulative abnormal return of SWF investments has an announcement effect similar to that of investments by hedge funds and institutional investors such as CalPERS on stock returns. In addition, investments by more transparent SWFs have a larger cumulative abnormal return by an order of 3.5, suggesting that voluntary SWF disclosure might serve as a signaling device to investors. In addition, Kotter and Lel (2008) also obtain a significant negative but small announcement impact from SWFs' divestures. Beck and Fidora (2008) conduct a country case study of Norway's SWF and ask whether its exclusion of companies that violate the ethical guidelines of the ministry of finance exhibit price pressures on those companies. Their findings suggest no significant negative abnormal returns following the divesture of these companies.
To summarize, existing research on SWFs suggests that they can be a stabilizing force in global financial markets. Event studies do not find a destabilizing impact from SWF investments and divestments in equity markets, while simulations of SWF asset allocations only imply a gradual shift with modest economic effects. With SWFs improving their transparency and disclosure over time, the availability of historical SWF transactions would provide researchers with the necessary data to further examine their implications for financial stability.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This empirical research assesses whether stock markets react to the announcements of investments and divestments to firms by SWFs using an event study approach. The objective is to investigate the information content of these announcements. Based on 166 publicly traceable hand collected events of investments and divestments by major SWFs during 1990-2009, this section evaluates the short-term financial impact of SWFs on selected public equity markets in which they invest. Moreover, the impact will be further analyzed on different sectors (financial and nonfinancial), actions (buy and sell), market types (developed and emerging markets), as well as level of corporate governance (higher and lower level). The results are expected to give some hints on how stock markets react to the capital investments and divestments by SWFs, and present some implications on SWFs' stabilizing role in global financial market. Investigating divestments is of particular interest since if stock price reactions are abnormally high (relative to the market) there may be destabilizing effects to the degree that others "front run," "herd" or otherwise mimic SWFs' investment behavior. This might be particularly problematic if prices slip below pre-defined target levels of other investors, and thus prompting their forced sales.
A. Data
Several SWFs that have bought or sold shares of firms in the advanced and emerging stock markets are included in the study. Table 1 describes the number of SWF investments and divestments across the country of target firms, while Table 2 displays the distribution of the sample by the identity of the acquiring SWF. Given public availability of individual buy and sell transactions, observation numbers by the two Singapore SWFs GIC and Temasek are dominating the sample. Figure 1 shows the ratios on SWFs' investments/ divestments in full sample as well as in sub samples-in financial and nonfinancial sectors-in developed and emerging markets and by SWFs with different levels of corporate governance. Note: 1)The SWFs with high level corporate governance refer to those whose total score is higher than 40, while low level refer to lower than 40 (Truman, 2008a; 2008b) ; 2) the ratios are calculated separately on the following six sub-groups: i) buy and sell; ii) buy and sell in financial sector, buy and sell in nonfinancial sector; iii) buy and sell in developed economies, buy and sell in emerging economies, iv) buy in developed economies, sell in developed economies, buy in emerging economies, sell in emerging economies; v) buy in financial sector, sell in financial sector, buy in nonfinancial sector, sell in nonfinancial sector; and vi) buy by high level governance, sell by high level governance, buy by low level governance, sell by low level governance.
B. Methodology
If markets are rational, the effects of an event should be reflected immediately in stock returns and prices. Thus, a measure of the event's impact can be constructed using stock prices and returns observed over a relatively short time period. To benchmark the returns of the stock relative to the event, the overall stock market returns, in percentage changes, for the corresponding country are used.
Specifically, the following steps are taken for implementing the event study:
 Determination of the selection criteria for the inclusion of given SWFs. The sample contains several SWFs, which have bought or sold stakes in financial firms and nonfinancial firms.


Collection of a number of such events and compilation of a list of firms and dates
by searching publicly-available databases to find news announcements on SWFs' actions.
 Identification of the events of SWFs' investments/divestments. Since the event date can be determined with precision, as regards to the short-term analysis, we employ a five-day (seven-day) event window, comprised of two (three) pre-event days, the event day, and two (three) post-event days. In this way, rumors that precede the formal announcement can enter the assessment. And as well, in illiquid markets, prices may take a couple of days to adjust to new information. As robustness tests, we vary the event window to four pre-event days, the event day, and four post-event days.
 Definition of the "estimation window." Following Peterson's framework (1989), we will estimate the market model on the 200 trading days ending 30 days prior to the announcement of the investments/divestments. Ending the sample prior to the event assures that the "normal" behavior of returns is not contaminated by the event itself.
For robustness tests, we vary the estimation periods (100 days and 300 days) and using price indices instead of total returns of each firms and economy. Specifically, the abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest. The aggregation can be along two dimensions-through time and across securities.
The individual securities' abnormal returns, in the case of five days, can be aggregated for each event day, t = t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2 during the event window. Given N events (a total of 166 in the entire sample), the sample average aggregated abnormal returns (AAR) for period t is
The average abnormal returns can then be aggregated over the event window to calculate the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for each firm i.
Testing whether the abnormal return is statistically different from zero. Since the numbers of observation in the event window are limited (five or seven days), we use t-tests rather than the Z score, the latter usually requiring at least 50 observations to get a statistically robust results.
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C. Empirical Results
Table 3 presents the AAR and CAAR for the (-2, +2), and (-3, +3) windows. In general, the AAR is positively associated with SWFs' buy actions and not significantly negatively with SWFs' sell actions in the full sample. Moreover, overall, the results suggest that the share price's combined responses to SWFs' investments and divestments in developed economies are significant (Panel C) , while those in emerging economies are not (Panel D) . In addition, SWF investments in the financial sector have a larger impact on share prices than in the nonfinancial sector. These differences in responses may be due to the relatively more transparent equity markets in developed economies as well as in the financial sector with potentially higher signaling and information flow. The impact is further analyzed on the investments/divestments separately in different market types (developed and emerging markets), different sectors (financial and nonfinancial), and level of corporate governance (high and low). In general, according to the AAR, investments in developed economies (Panel E) and emerging economies (Panel G) are statistically significant, while divestments in developed economies (Panel F) and emerging economies (Panel H) are generally statistically insignificant. These demonstrate that SWF investments produce positive impact in both developed and emerging economies while their divestments led to little negative impact.
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In addition, the positive impact of ARR and CAAR for the investments by low level governance SWFs are significantly larger than those by high level governance SWFs because the investment/divestment behaviors of low level governance SWFs may be more speculative and unexpected, thus triggering larger market impact upon the announcement of their actions. This is in line with the idea that transparency matters.
This could also indicate that the improvement of corporate governance in SWFs would be helpful in reducing the impact on market volatility 9 .
As a robustness check, we use the event window of (-4,+4) to test the impact of SWFs' actions. In addition, we vary the estimation periods (100 and 300 days). Finally, we use price indices of each firms and economy instead of total return. The results are robust to different event windows and the estimation periods, and the use of price indices (Table 4) .
D. Conclusion
This paper assesses whether and how stock markets react to the announcements of investments and divestments to firms by SWFs using an event study approach. Based on 166 publicly traceable events collected on investments and divestments by major SWFs during the period of 1990-2009, we evaluate the short-term financial impact of SWFs on selected public equity markets in which they invest. The impact is further analyzed on different sectors (financial and nonfinancial), actions (buy and sell), market types (developed and emerging markets), countries, and level of corporate governance (high and low). Overall, this event study does not find any significant destabilizing effect of SWFs on equity markets as measured by abnormal return behavior, which is consistent with the emerging academic literature that uses the event study methodology. This study contributes to the slowly emerging field of empirical studies of SWF behavior in financial markets.
However, it should be noted that the longer-term impact and the potentially stabilizing role of SWFs as major institutional investors will require a broader set of data and a more rigorous empirical assessment. The long-run impact of SWF investments could be subject to the macroeconomic and financial conditions. In the case of recent investments in some U.S. and European financial institutions under conditions of distress, SWFs' action could not buffer those institutions from further large losses. Therefore, it will be hard to draw conclusions for overall global and regional financial stability only from these 166 events. Other methods to examine the empirical impact of SWFs would require more detailed knowledge of SWF investments and their timing and amount-data that are presently not available. Some progress may be possible with hypothetical scenarios, but hypothetical market responses to SWF investments require a thorough understanding of how asset allocations are constructed and the size, depth, and breadth of the corresponding markets. 
